For Russia’s Sanctions-busting A7 Payment Service, International Transfers Start With Bags Of Cash At Moscow Markets. At Its Peak, It Processed At Least 58 Metric Tons In A Single Month.

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An investigation by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists traced how Russia’s A7 payment network moves cash collected at Moscow markets into international transfers. Its report says the system uses Promsvyazbank, intermediary companies in Kyrgyzstan, cryptocurrency and firms in other countries; the exact scale and details of every transaction remain unclear.

An investigation by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) has detailed how Russia’s A7 payment service routes funds abroad, tracing transactions from bags of rubles collected at Moscow markets through Promsvyazbank, cryptocurrency intermediaries and companies in other countries. The report describes a system used to move cross-border payments after sanctions restricted Russian access to conventional financial channels.

Based on internal company documents and interviews, the ICIJ report says cash is collected from vendors and other customers at several Moscow wholesale and retail markets, including Sadovod. A7’s records call the collection points “departments”; the investigation identified at least eight. Brokers count and bag the rubles, attach customers’ payment orders, and send the numbered bags by van to an A7 processing center in Moscow.

At the processing center, about 50 cashiers record the money in A7’s system, according to the documents reviewed by the journalists. The cash is then delivered to Promsvyazbank, which deposits it and credits A7’s accounts. The report says A7 uses companies registered abroad, including intermediaries in Kyrgyzstan that buy cryptocurrency through Grinex, an exchange the investigation links to A7.

From Kyrgyzstan, the funds are sent through intermediary companies in other countries, often in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, the report says. Those firms convert the cryptocurrency into local currencies and transfer money to recipients. The source material says that at its peak A7 processed at least 58 metric tons in a single month, but does not identify the precise month or explain whether that figure refers to cash handled at collection points or another stage of the network.

How A7 Moves Payments Across Borders

The investigation offers a view of how a Russian payment network can combine cash collection, bank services, cryptocurrency and overseas intermediaries to handle cross-border transfers. That matters because sanctions and the exclusion of Russian banks from SWIFT disrupted established routes, increasing the importance of alternative payment channels for businesses and individuals seeking to send or receive money.

The reported chain also raises questions for financial institutions and regulators in countries where intermediaries operate. The ICIJ’s account suggests that payments may pass through multiple jurisdictions and forms of value before reaching a recipient. That can make it harder to identify their original source, though the report does not establish that every A7 transaction evades sanctions or that every participant in the network breaks the law.

A7’s Place in Russia’s Shadow Payments Market

A7 is described in the source material as the largest player in Russia’s shadow cross-border payments market. It is controlled by Moldovan businessman Ilan Shor, who was convicted of fraud and embezzlement in Moldova; Russia’s state-owned Promsvyazbank owns the remaining 49 percent. The state development corporation VEB.RF is also described as providing support to A7.

Earlier reporting by the investigative outlet Proekt said A7 handled about 15 percent of Russian cross-border transfers, according to a business partner of Roman Abramovich, while A7 put its share at 19 percent. Other market sources cited by Proekt called A7 the sector’s largest operator. Proekt also reported that Abramovich may have a role in the company; his representatives denied his involvement. These claims are distinct from the ICIJ’s reporting on the payment process itself.

Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, cash intermediaries at Sadovod were already converting rubles into bank transfers or cryptocurrency, often for transactions connected to China. The ICIJ report says sanctions disrupted those established routes and that A7’s system enabled brokers to continue operating through a more elaborate network.

““Sadovod is simply a big client base.””

— A source familiar with A7’s operations, quoted by the ICIJ

Scale and Transaction Details Remain Unclear

The source material does not specify the month in which A7 handled at least 58 metric tons, the precise method used to calculate that amount, or how much of the reported cash ultimately became international transfers. It also does not provide a complete count of transactions, recipients or countries involved.

The reporting describes the network based on documents and interviews, but it does not establish that every payment follows the same route. The identities and roles of all intermediaries are not fully detailed in the material provided, and it remains unclear what steps regulators or financial institutions may take in response. Allegations about Abramovich’s involvement remain disputed: Proekt reported suggestions of a role, while his representatives denied it.

Regulatory Scrutiny and Further Reporting

The next developments to watch are whether authorities or financial institutions in the countries named in the investigation announce reviews, restrictions or enforcement actions involving A7-linked companies and payment routes. The material provided does not identify any specific action already scheduled.

Further reporting could also clarify the timing and basis of the 58-ton monthly figure, identify more intermediaries and recipients, and show whether A7’s routes or volume have changed. Until then, the ICIJ findings describe a reported operating model, not a complete account of all A7 transactions or a determination that each one violates sanctions.

Key Questions

What is A7?

A7 is a Russian cross-border payment service described in the reporting as the largest operator in the country’s shadow payments market. It is controlled by Ilan Shor, while Promsvyazbank owns 49 percent.

How does the reported payment route work?

The ICIJ says cash is collected at Moscow markets, processed at an A7 center, and deposited with Promsvyazbank. Companies in Kyrgyzstan then buy cryptocurrency, which is routed through overseas intermediaries and converted into local currency for recipients.

What does the 58-metric-ton figure refer to?

The source material says A7 processed at least 58 metric tons in a single month at its peak. It does not specify the month or define exactly which stage of the payment network the measurement covers.

Does the investigation prove that every A7 transfer breaks sanctions?

No. The report describes how the network operates and why it is used for cross-border payments. The material does not establish that every transaction violates sanctions or the law.

Source: rss